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REAL PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-TITLE ACQUIRED BY HUSBAND AND 
WIFE-John and Maltie Preston moved onto a parcel of land in 1910 where 
they lived until 1950 when John died intestate. Maltie died intestate in 
1954. Title to the land had been perfected by twenty years adverse 
possession. Evidence showed that the adverse possession was intended to 
inure to their joint benefi.t.1 Complainants, collateral heirs of John, sued 
in ejectment claiming that John took the whole title by exclusive adverse 
possession. Defendants, collateral heirs of Maltie, claimed a tenancy by 
the entirety had been created, with the survivor, Maltie, becoming the 
sole owner. The court of appeals ruled that the husband and wife had 
become tenants in common. On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, 
held, affirmed without opinion.2 Preston v. Smith, (Tenn. 1956) 293 S.W. 
(2d) 51. 
The principal case is the first to present the problem of the concurrent 
estate acquired by joint adverse possession of husband and wife. The 
common law knew no such question, £or the husband and wife composed 
1 It would seem that when a husband and a wife enter land and possess adversely to 
the true owner the prescription would ordinarily run in favor of the husband alone. The 
decision in the principal case does not indicate any evidence on which the court based its 
ruling that the possession was joint. If it was merely the fact that both husband and wife 
were on the land :without color of title, then all disseisin by married couples would lead 
to the creation of a concurrent estate. 
2 The opinion of the court of appeals was reprinted at the suggestion of the members 
of the Supreme Court. 
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one legal entity for property purposes.3 Thus adverse possession by a 
married couple became the sole possession of the husband. Married 
women's separate property acts have abolished this common law unity and 
permit the wife to hold property as though she were a single woman.4 
These statutes necessarily permit a married woman to become an adverse 
possessor. In ruling that a tenancy in common was created in the principal 
case, the Tennessee court relied primarily on the rule, stated mainly in 
dictum, that tenancy by the entirety must arise from conveyance or devise." 
The rationale of this rule is somewhat open to question inasmuch as the 
married women's acts, by destroying the marital proprietary unity, seem-
ingly sanction the joint disseisin of husband and wife and the creation 
of joint estates. The court's decision is not necessarily incorrect, but it 
should be pointed out that plausible arguments may be advanced as well 
in favor of either a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety. Littleton 
laid down the rule that two or more persons may disseise another to their 
joint use and thus become joint tenants.6 This rule has been followed 
by several cases, none of which examined the validity of Littleton's 
premise.7 Of course, this thread of authority makes no mention of the 
possibility of adverse possession raising a tenancy by the entirety because 
when the rule was founded the wife could not disseise her husband. Yet, 
if Littleton's rule is sound law, the modem rule abolishing the proprietary 
unity of marriage would clearly permit spouses to become joint tenants 
by adverse possession. From this proposition it is a short step to the crea-
tion of an estate by the entirety where local law presumes joint marital 
property to be held by the entirety.s It seems that all three concurrent 
estates are possible when a husband and wife jointly disseise another. 
In view of these possibilities, criteria by which the estate may be charac-
terized is essential. Clearly where the intent of the parties may be ascer-
tained it should control. Absent direct evidence of intent, the estate will 
probably be determined by prevailing construction preferences in the 
state. A number of states which do not recognize tenancy by the entirety 
3 Tyler v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 887; In re Brown, (W.D. Ky. 1932) 
60 F. (2d) 269; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §430 (1939). 
42 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §5.56 (1952). The Tennessee Married Women's Act 
was passed four years after the statute of limitations had begun to run but the court held 
this immaterial. 
5 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §430 (1939); Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 
164 N.E. 613 (1929). 
6 Lrrr. §278; Co. Lrrr. 181a; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §6.1 (1952). 
7 Putney v. Dresser, 43 Mass. (2 Mete.) 583 (1841); Ward v. Ward, L.R. 6 Ch. App. 
789 (1871). 
s There is some authority indicating that tenancy by the entirety can arise by prescrip-
tion. The common law rule that any estate real or personal vesting in husband and wife 
created a tenancy by the entirety could be stretched to cover adverse possession. FREEMAN, 
COTENANCIES AND PARTITION §63 (1894). It has been held that tenancy by the entirety may 
may be created by descent, which involves no instrument. Gillan's Exrs. v. Dixon, 65 Pa. 
395 (1870). Although that case involved personalty the court indicated that realty and 
personalty would be treated alike. Contra, 2 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY §6.6, n. 17 (1952). 
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favor tenancy in common over joint tenancy.9 In these jurisdictions 
specific intent to create a joint tenancy must be shown to rebut the crea-
tion of tenancy in common. It would seem clear that any court bound to 
such a rule would find a tenancy in common in the marital disseisin situa-
tion, since, by hypothesis, the intent of the parties is uncertain. On the 
other hand, jurisdictions which recognize tenancy by the entirety10 often 
tend to favor that estate where husband and wife are grantees of a joint 
estate.11 This policy would undoubtedly favor an estate by the entirety 
where intent is unclear. An opposing policy argument is that the abolition 
of the unity of husband and wife has destroyed the foundation of tenancy 
by the entirety. Thus no good reason exists for expanding the means of 
creating this estate when the theory underlying it no longer exists. Sim-
ilarly it may be pointed out that Littleton's rule favoring joint tenancy was 
developed when that was the favored estate.12 Today, the tenancy in 
common is preferred. Certainly the problem presented by the factual 
situation of the principal case may be resolved in a number of ways. 
Arguably the philosophy of modem law favoring emancipation of married 
women's property from the control of the husband would be best served 
by the result reached by the Tennessee court. Tenancy in common best 
protects the proprietary interests of the wife. Her interest does not depend 
on survival and alienability of her interests is more free. Nevertheless the 
principal case may be criticized for not considering the numerous possible 
answers to a novel and intriguing question of modem property law. 
Richard S. Rosenthal 
George F. Lynch, S.Ed. 
9 2 .AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §6.3, n. 1 (1952); 4 PoWEI.L, REAL PROPERTY §602 
(1954). 
10 A majority of the states recognize tenancy by the entirety. 2 .AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY §6.6 (1952). 
112 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §6.6, n. 9 (1952); Godman v. Greer, 12 Del. Ch. 397, 
105 A. 380 (1918); 161 A.L.R. 457 at 466 (1946). 
12 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §6.5 (1952). 
